

VZCZCXRO1256
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHSM #0414 1901349
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 091349Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4484
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 000414

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/MTR (JPHERRMANN, EUR/PRA, ANDEUR/NB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2034

TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [MTCRE](#) [SY](#) [SW](#)

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON SYRIAN EXPORT CONTROL CASE

REF: A. STOCKHOLM 283

[1](#)B. STATE 41047

Classified By: ACDA Laura Kirkconnell for reasons 1.4 (B), (D), and (H)

[1](#)1. (S) Principal Administrative Officer Magnus Danielsson, Swedish Inspectorate for Strategic Products (ISP), and Deputy Director Ulf Lindell, Division for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation at the Swedish MFA, told post on July 8 that ISP and the Swedish Security Service (SAPO) had concluded their investigation of Abene Machine AB. Abene Machine confirmed that it had exported milling machines to the Syrian firm Handasieh, but maintained that the machines in question, two-axis and manually operated machines, "were not controlled by any export regime." Abene Machine also reported that it had been approached by Handasieh to provide spare parts for these machines, but had not exported any items yet. The company also confirmed that a Syrian delegation from Handasieh visited Abene Machine in 2009 for education and training on the previously exported milling machines.

[1](#)2. (S) Danielsson stated that ISP has concluded that the Syrian training on the milling machines in question was not in violation of export control regulations. He also told us that ISP did not find it "likely" that the export of spare parts to the previously delivered milling machines, which ISP considers uncontrolled and not sensitive, would be subject to export control. Danielsson and Lindell both emphasized that they had described the preconditions for "catch all" controls and pointed out Abene Machine's responsibility to guarantee the legitimate use of these milling machines and that none of the requested spare parts was covered by export control regulation. Post will report any additional information septel.

[1](#)3. (S) Comment: Emboffs raised ref (a) points on Handasieh's role as a cover for Syria's Scientific Studies and Research Center. The Swedes elected not to comment on this point, however.
KIRKCONNELL